THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET   February 17, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 40

TO: The Secretary of State
             The Secretary of Defense
             The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and
             Coordination of Covert Action Operations

I have determined that it is essential to the defense and security
of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the
overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government continue to be
supplemented by covert action operations.

By covert action operations I mean those activities which, although
designed to further official U.S. programs and policies abroad, are
so planned and executed that the hand of the U.S. Government is not
apparent to unauthorized persons.

The covert actions of the U.S. Government abroad shall be subject
to coordination and control by the Director of Central Intelligence.
All such covert action operations, unless otherwise specifically
assigned by the President, shall be carried out by the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for assuring that covert action operations are planned
and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military
policies, and for consulting with and obtaining appropriate coordi-
nation from any other interested agencies or officers on a need-to-
know basis. The Director of Central Intelligence shall obtain
policy approval for all major and/or politically sensitive covert
action programs through The 40 Committee.

The 40 Committee as presently constituted consists of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the
Attorney General, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
Intelligence.

The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for insuring
an annual review by The 40 Committee of all covert action programs
previously approved.

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Also subject to The 40 Committee's policy review and specific
operational mission approval are the following programs origina-
ting in the Department of Defense: the monthly Joint Reconnais-
sance Center Schedule, missions of the National Reconnaissance   **25X1**
Organization [   ]   **NSC**
Furthermore, any proposals for covert activities or operations
from agencies not represented on The 40 Committee shall be
subject to that committee's approval unless otherwise directed
by the President.

Covert action operations shall include any type of activity
necessary to carry out approved purposes except that they will
not include armed conflict by regular military forces, or cover
and deception for active military operations by the armed forces
of the United States.

This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 5412/2.

cc: The Attorney General
      The Assistant to the President
         for National Security Affairs

TOP SECRET

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OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

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GROUP
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(40)

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TAB

The NSCIC

The NSCIC has met only once since its inception in 1971. This is due largely to the major preoccupations of its Chairman, Dr. Kissinger, since that time. In recognition of Dr. Kissinger's workload, the President recently appointed a Vice Chairman. I will fill that role, and I intend to commence a regular meeting schedule.

Since November 1971 the NSCIC has had a functioning Working Group. Its members have been the ASD(I), an Assistant Attorney General (occasionally), the J-3 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [and] a representative from the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and the Chief of the Net Assessment Group of the NSC Staff. The producers of intelligence serve on the Working Group as observer members (D/INR, D/DIA, DDI of CIA, DDS&T of CIA).

The Working Group has embarked upon three kinds of work:

1. Three crisis studies with recommendations for the DCI from the NSCIC on how intelligence could have served better. (The India-Pakistan War, the Arab-Israeli Ceasefire Crisis of 1970, and the Jordan-Fedayeen Civil War.)

2. An evaluation of how well the Community has functioned on a specific problem over a period of time. (Yugoslavia was the case study, given the potential for sudden change there and the obvious Soviet interest.)

3. Background studies to inform the NSCIC members:

a. A study of current intelligence reporting.

b. A study of the intelligence contribution to the anti-narcotics effort.

c. A study of economic reporting.

d. A study of resources devoted to production.

25X1

----------NOTE FOR MR. COLBY ----------

All of the above studies were sent to the NSCIC for action or information. Little or no response. A copy of memo to you on this problem follows.

5 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSCIC Record on Action Requests

1. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) was established by the President in his memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community." The NSCIC held its first and only meeting on 3 December 1971 at which the members agreed to the establishment of an NSCIC Working Group under the chairmanship of a representative of the DCI.

2. A total of six actions have been submitted to the Chairman, NSCIC, all of which called for some response. To date no formal reply has been received to any of the six action requests.

3. Briefly, the actions requested were as follows. A more complete account of these activities will be found at Tab A.

    a. Working Group request of 9 February 1972 for NSCIC approval of two proposed product evaluation projects, one on the India/Pakistan crisis and one of an evaluation of intelligence inputs to NSSMs.

    b. A request by the DCI to Dr. Kissinger on 24 February 1972 for comment on DCID 1/2 and its Supplement.

    c. A request from the DCI to Chairman, NSCIC, on 28 September 1972 for policy guidance on the present scope and character of current intelligence coverage.

    d. Submission of the NSCIC Working Group report on the India/Pakistan crisis study to the NSCIC on 5 October 1972 in order to initiate a discussion of major issues and problem areas highlighted by the study.

    e. Submission on 16 May 1973 of the NSCIC Working Group summary report of the three crisis studies with recommended actions for issuance by the NSCIC as guidance to the DCI.

    f. A recommendation by the DCI to the Chairman, NSCIC, on 3 August 1973 for reorganization of the NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group.

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Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group

1. Request for approval of two NSCIC Working Group product evaluation projects:

    Projects on the India/Pakistan crisis and an evaluation of intelligence inputs to NSSMs described to Chairman, NSCIC, in a memorandum of 9 February 1972, Subj: Progress Report on NSCIC Working Group, and NSCIC approval requested. Memo also requested any guidance the NSCIC might provide as to specific areas of interest on which it considered the Working Group could most profitably focus attention.

    Action: On 16 February, the Chairman, NSCIC, advised the NSCIC members by memorandum of the Working Group request and recommended approval of the projects identified. The memorandum also urged the Working Group "to continue its efforts to design a work program that will assist us in all of our tasks." In the absence of other direct communication, the Working Group proceded with the two projects.

2. Request for comments on DCID 1/2: As agreed by the Working Group, a letter was prepared and signed by the DCI to Dr. Kissinger on 24 February, forwarding a copy of DCID 1/2 and its Supplement and asking for his comments as to "how well you consider the listed objectives reflect White House and NSC requirements and how appropriate you consider the assigned priorities to be." The letter also asked for any proposals Dr. Kissinger might have as to addition or deletion of objectives, changes in priorities or other changes to improve the utility of the document.

    Action: No formal reply received, although informal comments were obtained from Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff.

3. Request for policy guidance on current intelligence reporting:

    By memorandum of 28 September 1972 to Chairman, NSCIC, the DCI reported on the results of a survey of current intelligence reporting by all elements of the intelligence community, done for the NSCIC Working Group, and asked for policy guidance to confirm whether the President and his advisors considered the present scope and character of current intelligence coverage was in keeping with today's U.S. security and policy interests.

    Action: none.

4. India/Pakistan crisis study:

    The NSCIC Working Group sent this study to the Chairman, NSCIC on 5 October 1972 for the purpose of initiating a "discussion of major issues and problem areas highlighted by the study."

Action: On 11 October, the NSC Staff Secretary sent a memo
to the NSCIC members asking for their written comments on the study
by 15 November in preparation for a meeting of the NSCIC.

The DCI replied saying that since the questions raised
in the study were addressed to consumers of intelligence, he considered
it inappropriate for him to reply. He advised that he would defer
comment until the views of the other members had been obtained, and
asked that copies of these replies be sent to him, at which time he
would prepare a response from the viewpoint of the intelligence
community. None of the replies were formally sent to the DCI,
but [   ] read the comments of Mr. Rush and Admiral
Moorer in Mr. Marshall's office and reported on them to the DCI
in preparation for an NSCIC meeting scheduled for 27 November, which
was never held.

5. NSCIC Working Group Report on Three Crisis Studies:

A summary report of the findings and recommendations resulting
from the Working Group survey of the Arab/Israeli Ceasefire, the
Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War, and the India/Pakistan crisis was
sent to the Chairman, NSCIC on 16 May 1973 under a memorandum from
the Chairman, NSCIC Working Group, in which he noted that the
recommended actions in the report constituted what the Working
Group proposed be issued by the NSCIC as guidance to the DCI.

Action: On 23 May 1973, the NSC Staff Secretary forwarded
copies of the summary report to the NSCIC members and asked for
their comments on the conclusions and recommendations by 15 June,
with copies to all members. She also asked the DCI to prepare
by the same date his recommended plan for acting on the issues
raised by the Working Group. She advised that a meeting of the
NSCIC would be scheduled at a later date.

The DCI replied with brief comments on the proposed
actions and noted that he would brief the committee in more detail
at the next NSCIC meeting. The only comment received here was
that of Mr. Clements.

6. Reorganization of the NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group:

On 3 August 1973 Mr. Colby sent a memorandum to the Chairman,
NSCIC, proposing four actions: name a deputy chairman, NSCIC (a consumer);
appoint Andrew Marshall chairman, NSCIC Working Group and restrict
Working Group membership to user representatives of NSCIC principals;
add an economic representative to the NSCIC and to the Working Group;
and have each NSCIC Principal name a deputy.

Action: No reply received. Mr. Colby's MOR on the PFIAB
meetings of 4 and 5 October 1973 note that Admiral Anderson recommended
to the President that the DCI be named Vice Chairman of the NSCIC and
that the President "approved and that be recommended to be done."
Mr. Marshall has transferred to the Defense Department.

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Executive Registry

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DCI/IC 73-1967

The Director

You asked about getting Treasury named to NSCIC. The attached provides a tally on matters you have raised with NSCIC and on which no actions have been taken. <u>Note</u> (3.f.): On 3 Aug 1973 your letter to Chairman recommended an economic representative, e.g., Treasury, be added to NSCIC.

At USIB you invited Treasury to attend the NSCIC in your role as Vice Chairman. We could formalize this with a letter to George Schultz over Henry Kissinger's signature or your own.

Yes ✓ No___   SIGNED
Henry's___ Mine ✓   Daniel O. Graham
                      6 November 1973

NOTED by DCI
11/8/73

DCI/IC:JMC:ibm
Distribution:
  O - Addressee w/att
  1 - DDCI w/att
  1 - ER w/att
  1 - D/DCI/IC w/att
  1 - IC Registry w/att
  1 - JMC w/att (chrono)

B

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION GUIDANCE

The ultimate customer of our national intelligence product is, of course, the President, with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serving as a conduit. Cabinet-level officers, primarily the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, are also key consumers.

The principal tasking mechanism for intelligence inputs into policy deliberations is the National Security Council and its subordinate organizatjons: Washington Special Action Group, Senior Review Group, Under Secretaries Committee, Defense Programs Review Committee, 40 Committee, Intelligence Committee, Vietnam Special Studies Group, Verification Panel on Strategic Arms Limitation, and Verification Panel on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. The Director of Central Intelligence, who holds membership on each of these organizations, serves as the intelligence advisor to the National Security Council. In this connection, his primary role is to provide the NSC, its members and its supporting organizations with the information and judgments about foreign developments which they need to formulate and implement national security policy.

Requirements for intelligence support are levied in various ways. Tasking may take the form of a written memorandum to the DCI from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or from an NSC Staff officer to a counterpart in a production office. In some instances a telephone call suffices. Or requirements may be laid on orally at a meeting of one of the NSC groups such as the WSAG.

During crisis situations requirements for intelligence inputs tend to be narrowly focused and are usually levied orally at a WSAG meeting or even telephonically. At times the air seems filled with requirements, often levied on more than one element of the Intelligence Community simultaneously. Time permitting, responses to such requirements are coordinated within the Community in order to produce one piece of paper. Some intelligence inputs are prepared on the initiative of the Director of Central Intelligence in anticipation of a perceived need on the basis of developments in the crisis situation.

During non-crisis situations the pace is not as hectic. Most requests for intelligence inputs to policy papers are levied by means of the formal issuance of a Study Memorandu. The three-principal types of Study Memoranda are the NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum -- issued over the signature of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), the NSC Under

Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum (issued by the Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee), and the CIEPSM (issued by the Director, Council on International Economic Policy). CIA represents the Intelligence Community in the Study Memorandum process -- a systematized procedure by which the President (or his key advisors) directs the attention of the bureaucracy to national security issues. The issuance of a Study Memorandum requires the preparation of a Response, usually by an ad hoc committee or working group. Requirements levied in the Study Memorandum may be refined informally at thw working group level through the direct participation of and discussion by the representatives of the various agencies on the working group.

Intelligence Community support to negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions includes assessments of the military posture for each side, evaluations of our ability to monitor compliance with proposed agreements, and the provision of on-site intelligence teams to provide prompt support to the U.S. negotiators in Geneva and Vienna.

The Community also supports various Department heads in their participation in other international conferences. For example, we provide support to the Secretary of Defense in NATO meetings, and to the Secretary of the Treasury at World Bank meetings and other economic negotiations. And of course considerable support is provided in connection with the foreign travels of the President, the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and other Cabinet-level officials.

The frequent contacts between the policymaker and the Intelligence Community at various levels (policymaker and DCI or Department head, senior staffer and senior operating official, working group analysts, etc.) provide constant opportunities for levying and refining intelligence requirements.

C

Intelligence Collection Guidance

Intelligence collection guidance helps collectors of intelligence use their resources to acquire and report that information which is most relevant to the intelligence production process. Intelligence production, in turn, responds to the information requirements of policy level consumers in the United States Government.

Intelligence collection guidance is directed toward all collection systems, human and technical. It must provide answers to two basic questions of collection system managers: (1) What substantive information does the intelligence production process need which is feasible for collection by my resources? (2) How important and useful to the intelligence production process has been the information collected by my resources to date?

There are two approaches to intelligence guidance: (1) Program guidance, which is intended to assist collection managers in the planning of resource allocation to meet longer term information needs, and (2) Exploitation guidance, which relates to the day-to-day tasking or use of existing collection assets. Both of these approaches respond to the question of need.

Program guidance includes, in the first instance, basic intelligence objectives and priorities as defined in DCID 1/2 (Tab *0*), Key Intelligence Questions (Tab *2*), or other broad statements of information needs. This guidance also emanates from the relevant USIB Committees such as the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SIGINT Committee. The Interagency Clandestine Collection Priority Committee (IPC) provides a list of basic or long range information needs which can be satisfied by CIA clandestine collection, and the Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming (IGCP) list advises NSA of the information needs which might be satisfied by COMINT. Other guidance documents are selectively prepared on specific intelligence problems (e.g., Laser Technology, Soviet Command and Control), and detail what we know about a given problem, the information gaps, and source leads.

TAB
References
Are In
Book II

Guidance for exploitation is used in the short term, when
a collector has an opportunity to exploit an unexpected source
and requires substantive guidance on specific information needs.
The standard ad hoc requirement system which is used effectively
against known sources is effective here. In addition, the
Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) (Tab/3) offers good
exploitation guidance and is produced on a tri-annual basis for
each major area of the world. The Economic Alert List (EAL)
(Tab/5) covers short term economic requirements. Such
reporting guidance cites the specific information needs of the
analysts on a current basis within the context of their views and
understanding of a given intelligence problem.

TAB References Are In Book II

In answering the vital question of the usefulness of the
collector's product, intelligence guidance takes the form of
assessments. Detailed reviews by producers and consumers
of the "take" from collection activity provide feedback to the
collectors in terms of the precision of their reporting and its
relevance to the real information needs of those in Washington.
Assessments also provide the intelligence managers with an
appreciation of what they are getting for their money. They
can have a significant impact on collection planning by taking
into account the importance of the reporting to US interests,
how the information was used, the impact of not having it,
and alternative means of collection. Such assessments may be
made of a single facility or source, of an entire collection
sytem, or they may be related to a particular intelligence
problem.

TAB

A

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B

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

C

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

D

E

F

G

H

J

25X1A

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

L

ORGANIZATIONAL REFERENCES

A

THE COMMISSION HAS THIS CHART

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                President

National
Security ───────── NSC ─────────── WSAG
Advisor                            NSCIC
                                   40-Committee

        IRAC ──── DCI ──── USIB


 CIA    State    AEC    Justice   Treasury              DOD

                                            NSA    ASDI    JCS

 DDCI   Director  Asst. General  Assistant  Special Asst.
        of        Manager for    to         To Secretary for   Director
        Intelligence National    Director    Natl. Security
        and Research Security    FBI

                                        Army    Navy    Air Force    DIA

                                                                      DDIA

                                        ACSI  USN  USMC  ACSI

                                              DNI   G-2
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| Deputy— Intell. | Deputy— Operations | Deputy— Science & Technology | Deputy— Management & Support | D/DCI/IC | D/DCI/NIO |

──────── Executive Control

─ ─ ─ ─ Membership on USIB

B

Legal/Administrative framework . . .

| NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 |
| NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES |
| DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES |

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET

NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

NSC SPECIAL COMMITTEES
NSC INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

C

SECRET

National Intelligence . . .

POLICY	PRODUCTION	RESOURCES
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.	UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD	INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PRES. FOREIGN INTEL. ADVISORY BOARD	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR (DCI)	(CHAIRMAN)	(CHAIRMAN)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
	DEPARTMENT OF STATE (INR)	OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE PRESIDENT	DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE VICE PRESIDENT	NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SEC. OF STATE	DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
SEC. OF DEFENSE	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
DIR. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION	
NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE	ARMY, NAVY, AIRFORCE (OBSERVERS	
	USIB COMMITTEES	
ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS		25X1A
ATTORNEY GENERAL		
UNDER SEC. OF STATE		
DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE		
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE		
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF		
NSC COMMITTEES		
CONGRESSIONAL ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES		

IMPLEMENTATION

SECRET

D

The United States Intelligence Board ...

CHAIRMAN: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

MEMBERS:

CIA	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
STATE	THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIA	DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NSA	DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
TREAS	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SEC. OF TREASURY
AEC	DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ATOMIC ENERGY COM.
FBI	ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE OBSERVERS

- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
- Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence United States Air Force

COMMITTEES

- Critical Collection Problems
- Economic Intelligence
- Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
- Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
- Intelligence Information Handling
- Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
- Interagency Defector
- Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
- National Intelligence Survey
- Scientific Intelligence
- Security
- SIGINT
- Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
- Watch
- SALT Steering Group

E

the relationships of the DCI to the President and the Foreign Intelligence Community

Policy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- SECRETARY OF STATE
- VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U S
- PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.
- DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
- SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Objectives

NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

- DCI (V Chm)
- U/SEC STATE
- ASST TO THE PRES. FOR NAT'L SEC. AFFAIRS (Chm)
- D SEC DEF
- AT Y GEN
- CHM

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Requirements

- FBI REP
- DIR INR
- DDC' (V Chm)
- DC' (Chm)
- D'R DIA
- DIR NSA
- TREAS REP
- AEC REP

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Resources

- CIA
- STATE
- DC' (Chm)
- DEFENSE
- OMB

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Implementation

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

- DEFENSE
- CIA
- STATE

F

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THE COMMUNITY ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

This chart displays the component elements of the National Intelligence Community and their subordination to the DCI under the President's 5 November 1971 directive in all matters related to national intelligence planning and resource allocations. The dotted lines represent management responsibility.

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                        ┌──────────┐
                        │   DCI    │
                        └──────────┘

┌────────────┐                  ┌──────────┐                    ┌──────────┐
│ SEC/STATE  │                  │  EXCOM   │                    │ SEC/DEF  │
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
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RANSOM MONOGRAPH

Mr. Colby -

    The attached monograph was sent to the Murphy Commissioners along with Kirkpatrick's book. No need to read it all: Underlinings appear on pages 5, 8, 9, 14 to 18.

    Note that on page 16, wherein Ransom proposed future research topics for serious students of intelligence, we find a series of questions "remarkably like" those the Commission asked you.

    On page 17 is a comment about the role of Congress vis-a-vis intelligence which you may want to address from your experience. At the bottom of page 17 is a key question about whether in the final analysis intelligence makes a difference in the formulation of foreign policy.

    Page 9 raises a question about resources and requirements not so different from Welles' article in the <u>Monitor</u> on "weakened intelligence." Page 8 correlates the growth of intelligence with the difficulty of setting requirements. It suggests lack of discipline on the requirements side when resources are not scarce -- probably true.

    Page 16, question 2, asks to what extent the "Community" exists in fact, as well as on paper.

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Strategic Intelligence

HARRY HOWE RANSOM

Vanderbilt University

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Introduction

The most common meaning of the term "strategic intelligence" is evaluated and processed information about the power and intentions of foreign nations or other external phenomena of significance in decision-making councils. Most generally the term refers to the informational needs of national government officials, particularly foreign and defense policy makers. But private sector industries and organizations, such as political parties, may require strategic intelligence about their competitors, and so industrial and political intelligence collection including espionage is widespread within national boundaries. In this module, however, strategic intelligence will be analyzed primarily as an element of international politics.

The purpose here will be to describe and analyze strategic intelligence in the context of national security (foreign and military) policy making, to describe the nature and process of the intelligence function and the varieties of intelligence product, to describe the organizational setting of intelligence systems, and to analyze strategic intelligence systems as a frontier for social science research.

Some Definitions

Few subjects in the social sciences must be dealt with on the basis of such limited access to hard evidence as is the case in dealing with strategic intelligence. Any scholar pursuing this subject will encounter substantial barriers to the facts needed to authenticate his judgments or to illustrate descriptively and analytically the structure and functions of strategic intelligence systems.

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An unavoidable fact is that most of the archives or official records of the intelligence agencies are closed for an indefinite period. Officials working within the system are sworn to secrecy so that systematic interviewing of active intelligence professionals or "participant-observation" is not usually a realistic research alternative. Then, too, the constant flow of "intelligence" data to analysts and decision makers is so voluminous that, even were access to them possible, formidable problems of analysis would confront the scholar.

And yet there is a growing bibliography on the subject that ranges from unauthorized disclosures, such as those made by political "defectors" or "leaks" motivated by a dissenting ideological posture—as in the "Pentagon Papers"—to the inevitable disclosures resulting from a political system with separated powers and a free press. This inevitable "leak" explains in part why the greatest amount of information about intelligence systems pertains to the United States. Also, the general subject has attracted a vast array of popular writing because of the mystery and romance associated with the work of the spy or secret agent, even though he plays a relatively minor role in strategic intelligence. A large amount of internal writing on the subject exists within the intelligence system but is closed to outside scholarly scrutiny.

The pivotal importance of intelligence, whatever its form, in a rational system of decision making probably cannot be exaggerated. Complete and accurate information—almost never available—cannot assure the optimum decision. But false or misleading information demonstrably can subvert the attainment of policy objectives. In the principal institutions for foreign and defense policy making, intelligence functions and intelligence products have become routine elements of the decisional setting. Strategic intelligence has an enormous potential influence in shaping decisions, but the visible record makes clear that this influence has an uneven impact.

Great confusion has come to be associated with the term "intelligence." The term has in effect lost precise meaning in common usage since it is used to denote a wide variety of national security functions. In common usage, three main categories of activity come under the rubric of "intelligence." First is information gathering, by a variety of means including espionage, and the analysis and reporting of this information. This is the primary meaning and the principal function of an intelligence agency. A second usage denotes what more accurately should be termed counterintelligence. This is a police or security function relating primarily to the protection of information or the security of an intelligence service and its personnel.

It is primarily a negative function—whereas strategic intelligence is a positive function—but there is often much doctrinal, organizational and semantic confusion in the use of the terms "intelligence" and "counterintelligence." The third role commonly subsumed under a label of "intelligence" is covert political action, subversion, or a variety of secret operations including para-military adventures. A variety of foreign political interventions are undertaken by intelligence agencies, even though labeling them as "intelligence" is a distorted use of the term. Secrecy is the common bond, but intelligence and covert political action are separate, even disparate, functions. The semantic confusion has been compounded by organizational arrangements that assign such disparate functions to a unified administrative headquarters, such as the American Central Intelligence Agency.

While on the subject of definitions, the adjective "strategic" needs brief attention. Strategy, in its basic meaning, implies the economic allocation of resources toward the attainment of objectives. The importance of this definition is that it incorporates evaluated information, i.e. "intelligence," as an essential and unavoidable element in any conception of a decision-making system. The common meaning of strategic intelligence is the evaluated information needed at high-level policy-making levels for the economic allocation of resources not only toward national objectives but also toward the formulation of such objectives. It is common to make a distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence is more accurately called operational intelligence, or that information required by commanders in the field, whether military, diplomatic, or other "commanders" needing such evaluated information for carrying out specific foreign missions. Probably the distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence is vanishing under the impact of fast communications and accelerating technology. Information that once was considered to be only of importance to operational commanders may now be of great importance also to those in the high-policy commands. A major field commander, once concerned only with combat or operational level information, today may require much the same kind of information needed at the level of the President or the Secretary of State, and *vice versa*.

Categories of Intelligence

In truth, intelligence categories are endless. For analytic purposes, however, it is useful to stipulate arbitrarily certain categories. In an age of information explosion, intelligence must be pursued in functional

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categories, and the labor of thousands of intelligence professionals must be divided accordingly. The Defense Department requires military intelligence; the Atomic Energy Commission needs a specialized information; the State Department needs particular kinds of political and economic information; and the Presidency needs an amalgam of these and many more varieties of information. Intelligence activity has consequently become a vast world-wide industry, with total U.S. government expenditures on intelligence estimated at around $6 billion (1972), directly employing more than 200,000 persons in the United States and many thousands more overseas.

When describing kinds of intelligence, ultimately one must refer to both users and sources of particular types of information, for these end-points sometimes determine the categories. It is important to be reminded of the fact that in some information categories the data can be expected to be "hard" (measurable data), while in others they will be "soft" (predictions of future human or national behavior).

A sharp boundary line cannot be drawn around the sources or the potential users of intelligence. They are boundless, and intelligence agencies and activities tend to expand apace as they are commanded to gather "all the facts," sometimes merely in anticipation of their possible future use. One may, however, arbitrarily list the major categories as follows: political, military, economic, scientific, biographic, and geographic. In recent years, technology has afforded new machines and skills that have been used to develop the analytic capability in each of these categories, particularly as computer technology, versatile photographic and interpretation techniques, and all forms of communications have rapidly advanced.

Political intelligence is perhaps the most sought after and least reliable, or in one sense the most "unknowable," of the various types of intelligence. This field is heavily dependent upon advances in the social sciences, where professional scholars aspire to construct theories of political behavior. In estimations of political situations, intelligence analysts must deal with human dynamics. Consequently they focus on political patterns and trends. Hard data in this category include such elements as census data, voting records, party organization and leadership, and content analysis of politically significant documents.

Diplomats have long been prime collectors of political intelligence, and, in the absence of an inherent competition from bureaucratic rivals, their labor is shared with intelligence analysts. Diplomats normally seek data overtly from non-secret sources; intelligence agents secretly ferret underground sources and roam the back streets and seek political information by illegal or devious means. Diplomats are not expected to soil their hands in espionage. Yet they have come to share, sometimes reluctantly, their classical role of political reporting with secret agents, whom they sometimes refer to—not always lovingly—as "spooks." The raw product from both diplomats and spies is supplied to analysts whose mission is to interpret political trends, to discover the true locus of governmental power, and to discover and measure the various political factors that affect the foreign policies of nations.

Military intelligence is another prime category. The historical derivation of the intelligence function and much intelligence doctrine is military. Intelligence agencies have a close kinship with the institutions of military security. For more than a century and a half it has been customary for nations to exchange military attachés, even between adversary nations. During all the years of Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union have exchanged military attachés, whose prime function is intelligence—albeit overt intelligence—and who, in Alfred Vagts' words, were "nearly always more warlike in their outlook than the ambassadors" and tended to make reports with their own service's budgetary welfare in mind [1967, p. xi]. Ironically, military information is often more difficult to obtain in peacetime than during war. During war information considered to be of greatest value pertains to military organization and equipment, procedures and formations, and the number of units and total personnel—what the military call "order of battle" information. Of prime concern are essentially those elements of information thought to provide forewarning of an attack or signs of weakness that offer opportunities for attack or counter-attack.

Economic determinism aside, one can concede the often dominating importance of *economic factors* as influences on domestic and foreign policies. Thus these kinds of factors constitute major arenas for intelligence analyses. Economic resources are patently an important element in calculating a nation's military power, will condition to an important if not entirely predictable degree its political development, and generally will impinge significantly upon the conduct of foreign policy. Unemployment in Brazil, a food shortage in Japan, the level of rice production in Southeast Asia, a balance of payments crisis in the United States or Germany—all will affect the particular nation's foreign policy. Intelligence analysts must be concerned constantly with economic factors and with collecting data on such factors as trade, finance, and gross national product.

Specialists involved in the function of selecting "war plan" targets for bombers or missiles as ultimate policy instruments must concern themselves with the sensi-

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tive elements of a nation's economic system. Target selection is one grim job of the intelligence analyst specializing in economics.

Intelligence centering on scientific development has become increasingly important with each passing year. During a period when technology creates a nip and tuck race between offensive military capabilities and defensive measures and between new intelligence collection methods and new techniques of protecting secret information (counter-intelligence), intelligence systems have to be on guard against scientific or technological breakthroughs that may give one side a decisive advantage against the other. So analysts in the field of *scientific intelligence* center attention on data about foreign advances in nuclear energy, electronic, chemical, and biological sciences and science's boundless frontiers.

Biographic data, dealing with questions of "who's who" in international politics, are also of prime importance to decision makers. If the intelligence system is expected to produce estimates of a foreign nation's future behavior, it obviously is necessary to have detailed information about the personal background and characteristics of its decision makers.

As the number and activity of international organizations increase apace, biographic information becomes a constant need. Furthermore, as nations are constantly represented by negotiators at international conferences, biographic background data is a constant need for envoys. It is standard operating procedure that negotiators are "briefed" with biographic information about their foreign counterparts in international negotiations.

Geographic intelligence, largely self-defining, is an obvious intelligence category. Since geography clearly has some bearing on a nation's resources, cumulative power, and its culture and politics, geographic data constitute a major category in intelligence work. Thus whether it be for purposes of targeting for contingent strategic attack or for predicting next year's gross national product, intelligence agencies are constantly at work compiling new data on foreign population, topographies, climates, and an increasingly wide range of ecological factors. A decision maker's inquiry to an intelligence analyst may range from "What is the length of the rainy season in Rangoon?" to "What will be the configuration of Chinese nuclear power in 1980?"

## Importance to Decision Making

In today's real world of revolutionary ferment, the real-life intelligence officer—as contrasted with the James Bond stereotype—is a person almost always anonymous to the public but who often occupies the center in policy storms over foreign and defense policy. At the heart of these great debates, frequently, are the differing judgments and assumptions about the present and particularly the future. Often at issue are questions of *power*, *probability* and *time*. This is to say that the function of intelligence almost always must be involved with measurements of power interlaced with estimates of probable behavior, and both in the context of a time framework. An ideal strategic intelligence system would provide a nation's leader and his principal deputies with precise knowledge of the power of a foreign adversary, the probability of his action or reactions in given contingencies, and a time schedule for the unfolding of events.

This ideal would suggest a reasonable premise that knowledge is power. The use of the term power here is in the sense of *means* for accomplishing the objectives of policy and strategy. If knowledge is power in relation to objectives, then lack of information (or misinformation) can be subversive to the accomplishment of objectives. Although we must be on guard against simplistic interpretations, compelling evidence exists that great wars in the twentieth century have been the result of misinformation—of poor intelligence estimates if you will. At the same time it can be noted that near disasters have occurred to the United States—at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962—and to other nations because of the misinterpretation or misuse of what we recognize from hindsight to have been good information.

This point serves to remind us that *collection* of information is one thing; its proper interpretation is another; its communication to where it is needed is still another; and ultimately its use is another, and sometimes the most crucial, step in a complex process. While each of these is a separate element or "steps in a process," each is also closely interrelated.

It may be useful to think about strategic intelligence with the aid of a simple graphic conception of decision making for foreign and defense policy. As a macro-view of such decisions, one might view the process on the pattern of a triangle.

Ends

Intelligence   Means

The "Ends" represent the aspirations, objectives or goals of policy. While these may be set in the abstract

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and perhaps sometimes are, the realistic policy maker must fix specific goals in terms of an estimate of both the means available *and* an estimate of the situation (intelligence). The "Means" represent the power available, usually in instrumental categories, such as economic, military, or persuasive (propaganda resources) power. But such means can only be understood in the context of the situation as estimated by an intelligence analyst. Meanwhile the structure, scope, and activities of the "Intelligence" instrument are determined by the goals sought and the power to be exercised. It can be argued, however, that "Intelligence" is ultimately the key point of the triangle.

Nature of Intelligence

In essence, the task of intelligence is to provide the decision maker with all the information he needs prior to a decision [Platt 1957]. Some things in essence are "unknowable," so this is an impossible task in the abstract. Intelligence therefore comes to be conceptualized in functional categories, derived from a set of explicit or implicit requirements. This is to say that decision makers require strategic intelligence that will range from the spot news report (evaluated) to the encyclopedic datum. In between will be a range of summaries, "briefings," digests and "National Intelligence Estimates."

In order that labor be divided in a vast intelligence bureaucracy and so that purposeful collection plans can be drawn and missions assigned, certain functional intelligence categories have come into existence. Three such major categories have come into common usage, influenced by Sherman Kent's trail-blazing book, *Strategic Intelligence*, first published in 1949. These are (1) basic descriptive or generalized information usually pertaining to "hard" or "knowable" data, such as population or economic facts; (2) current reportorial or current estimate information, such as the political party alignment in a foreign nation at a given instant; and (3) speculative-evaluative, or the forecasting or warning kind of information, such as a prediction that a particular government will fail a vote of confidence in its parliament next week. Categories such as these are likely to be interrelated, and the same data base can serve each.

The basic descriptive function is performed essentially by government publication of a series of intelligence encyclopedias, which are constantly updated and expanded. They differ from the ordinary encyclopedia in that they are organized by countries or other special categories, rather than alphabetically. One element of the strategic intelligence function, therefore, employs

thousands of individuals whose task is to keep up to date a series of reference volumes that can provide the answers to a wide variety of questions about almost any part of the world. If a Presidential assistant should ask whether a particular hotel in Afganistan has alternating or direct electric current, the expectation is that the intelligence system can provide this datum.

Specifically, the basic descriptive element is embodied in what, in the United States intelligence system, are called National Intelligence Surveys (NIS). These are the composite product of the various elements making up the national intelligence system. Army intelligence, for example, is responsible for supplying data on foreign topographical features; the Air Force supplies information on landing fields and aircraft facilities in a variety of foreign settings; and the Navy supplies data on ports, harbors and shoreline features. Bits and pieces that go into the final composite called the National Intelligence Survey may be published separately to serve particular functional needs and to avoid delays that would occur in waiting for the amalgamation of the entire survey. The NIS of the American government has grown in scope and size to the point where it could be described authoritatively some years ago as more than ten times the size of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Inevitably, comprehensive digests of various NIS sections have been published for internal intelligence use, so that manageable sections are available by subject or by particular section of the world. These kinds of strategic intelligence may be used by diplomats preparing for foreign assignment, by military planners, by propaganda officials and foreign aid officers, or by policy makers at the highest National Security Council level.

Even the digests of sections of the National Intelligence Survey inevitably become dated because of editorial and production lead-times, making necessary a second category of intelligence reports: current reporting. Organizationally this function is assigned to a separate institution within the bureaucracy, called the Office of Current Intelligence or a similar name.

Current reports of strategic intelligence come in a variety of forms, ranging from "raw intelligence"—which is similar to journalistic reporting, and so in a sense "hot off the wires"—to a "National Intelligence Estimate" that would be the careful product of the entire intelligence system. Let us detail here the major categories in which current information is produced and reported:

Raw intelligence takes the form of a "news flash" reported through the intelligence system. For example a Presidential Assistant or Secretary of State might be informed in the middle of the night: "A *coup d' etat* has occurred in Iraq, staged by a group of Army

officers." Although the collector of this "raw" flash may have evaluated its source and content, it has not been evaluated from the broader perspective of a higher level in the intelligence system.

The next morning, a second category would emerge from the system in the form of a written memorandum. This might give the background to the *coup d'etat* in Iraq, update the news flash, and set the topic into such context as could be assembled within a few hours from government-wide sources. Therefore it would be somewhat less "raw"; nonetheless, a policy maker would be wise to consider it only "half-baked."

Current intelligence reporting can take a third form, that of the oral briefing. This can be a supplement to the written memorandum or a substitute for it when demanded by the busy policy maker. The personality of some policy makers leads them to prefer the oral briefing to the written report. Some policy makers are better listeners than readers, and their tastes become known. Keep in mind that the intelligence professional normally has a vested or personal human interest in knowing that his product has impact within the system and will go out of his way to maximize this impact.

Another form of current reports is the routine daily publication. Within national intelligence systems of the great powers, current intelligence appears in a variety of forms, for a variety of clienteles. These range from the exclusive brochure labeled, "For the President. Intelligence Checklist. Top Secret," to the "Daily Intelligence Digest" with a wider, although limited, circulation in policy-making councils. Still another form is the weekly or monthly publications summarizing the foreign situation in various categories. In these publications, estimates of the situation can be put in greater perspective than in the daily publications.

Finally, current intelligence may appear as a "National Intelligence Estimate," which is the product of the entire intelligence system. The NIE can take various forms, ranging from a "crash" estimate produced on short notice; a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), which may be produced within several days dealing with a special problem; or a standard NIE, which may represent six months of work by many hundreds of analysts.

Until very recently, it was not possible to illustrate concretely these forms of intelligence product. But through a series of events, particularly the "Pentagon Papers" episode, authentic examples are available. Following is an example of a Special National Intelligence Estimate. This document is marked SNIE 53-2-61, 5 October 1961, with the cover note that it was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, who noted that participants in producing the estimate were the CIA, intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The estimate had the concurrence of specified representatives of the organizations listed above, plus the Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Director, National Security Agency. Representatives to the Board from Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI abstained, "the subject being outside their jurisdiction" [*United States-Vietnam Relations*, 1971 Book 11, pp. 292-294].

Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government of Vietnam

The Problem

To estimate the extent and nature of Bloc support of the Communist effort against South Vietnam.[1]

The Estimate

1. The Communist subversive and guerrilla apparatus in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, is an integral part of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and it looks to Hanoi for political and military guidance and various forms of support. Hanoi is the implementing agency for Bloc activity in South Vietnam, and the Hanoi authorities are allowed considerable local freedom in conducting Viet Cong guerrilla and subversive activity. The Communist Bloc probably views the guerrilla and subversive campaigns in Laos and South Vietnam as two parts of a single broad political-military strategy, and of the two, considers South Vietnam as the more significant prize.

2. The Viet Cong are using Maoist tactics. A large part of the North Vietnam Army was trained in Communist China during the Indochina war ending in 1954, and some of these troops are leading operations in South Vietnam now. Each Bloc country has supported the "struggle" in the South with propaganda, notably during Pham Van Dong's trip to other Bloc areas in June–August, 1961.

3. Since early 1960 a general Hanoi-directed political and paramilitary Communist offensive against President Diem and his government of Vietnam (GVN) has been underway, and during the past year this campaign has taken on increased tempo and scale. The Viet Cong apparatus has undergone rapid expansion, and the scope and area of operations of its guerrilla units have increased significantly. More recently, the Viet Cong has begun to operate in larger sized units (500-1,000 men) and they have extended large-scale attacks to include, for the first time, the plateau area in the northern part of South Vietnam.

4. Apparently in response to this direction from Hanoi, cadre personnel and many special items, such as communications equipment, chemicals, medical supplies, and other items needed for guerrilla warfare not available in the countryside, are being infiltrated into South Vietnam via long established land and sea routes. Thousands of junks which ply the coastal routes of the Indochina peninsula

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1. For a broader treatment of the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, see NIE 143/53–61. "Prospects for North and South Vietnam," dated 15 August 1961.

provide a means of infiltration extremely difficult to control. Mountain trails in southern Laos have been used freely by the Communists for years for movements of men and supplies between North and South Vietnam. Other infiltration routes pass through Cambodia. Nevertheless, the Viet Cong effort is still largely a self-supporting operation in respect to recruitment and supplies. The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail. Most of their arms and much of their ammunition have been locally acquired or captured from GVN Army and security forces.

5. We estimate present armed, full-time Viet Cong strength at about 16,000, an increase, despite substantial combat losses, of 12,000 since April of 1960 and of 4,000 in the past three months. About 10–20 per cent of total Viet Cong strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North Vietnam mostly via mountain trails through southern Laos. Most of the remaining 80–90 percent of the Viet Cong are local recruits, but they also include remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during the 1954–1955 regroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese Communist Army units following the Indochina War. Approximately 90,000 Vietnamese Communist troops were evacuated to North Vietnam during this period, most of whom were from south and central Vietnam. It is from this pool of experienced fighters that most of the guerrilla cadres now operating in South Vietnam are drawn. These hard-core guerrillas are augmented by several thousand supporters who, under the cover of normal civilian pursuits, join the organized insurgent bands to assist in intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, and terrorist operations. In addition, local inhabitants in many areas provide the Viet Cong with recruits, food, refuge, and operational support, in some cases voluntarily and in others as the result of intimidation or coercion.

6. As part of the buildup for their current campaign, the Viet Cong have established an extensive communications network. Much of the communications equipment in use is probably quite primitive and some of it is assembled in the field. There is evidence, however, that in addition there are substantial quantities of sophisticated communications equipment and well-trained technicians serving the Viet Cong. Such equipment and the necessary maintenance and operating personnel were infiltrated into South Vietnam.

7. There has been no positive identification of Bloc manufactured military equipment in South Vietnam. Most of the arms and equipment now in use by the Viet Cong is of US or French origin. Although weapons have been infiltrated from North Vietnam, most Viet Cong equipment is probably from caches established at the end of the Indochina War or is equipment captured from GVN armed forces or security forces. During 1960, over 3,000 small arms were lost by GVN armed forces during combat. Some items, such as grenades, land mines, booby traps, and small arms ammunition are locally manufactured by village level Viet Cong "arsenals," from materials procured locally or imported from North Vietnam and Cambodia. Moreover, in view of the physical problems of infiltrating large amounts of arms and ammunition into South Vietnam, many Viet Cong operations are primarily for the purpose of capturing arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and other equipment. A major buildup of Bloc equipment in

South Vietnam is likely to await the improvement of lines of communication into and within South Vietnam.

8. *Outlook.* Viet Cong control of the Ca Mau peninsula at the southern tip of South Vietnam has been virtually complete for several years. During the dry season beginning in November, the Viet Cong will probably intensify the exploitation of GVN weaknesses in the plateau areas of the north and central parts of the country, seeking to establish another "liberated area" as a logistics base from which larger scale operations could be mounted. The creation of a second "liberated area" in the plateau region adjacent to southern Laos would enable the Viet Cong to keep GVN forces split and prevent the concentration of effort against either. Moreover, a strong Viet Cong position in the plateau area would seriously threaten the rear of Diem's troops posted along the demilitarized zone.

9. To a considerable extent the ability of the Viet Cong to maintain this expanded effort will depend upon improved logistical support from the outside. It is probable that the Bloc intends to build up the eastern part of south Laos, improving the roads, mountain trails, and airfields, as a major supply channel to support a stepped up Viet Cong campaign in north and central Vietnam. There has already been a considerable increase in Communist troop strength in south Laos, a substantial supply buildup, particularly east of Thakhok, and an increase in the Communist airlift into the area.

It is extremely revealing, and a unique opportunity, to have this look at an actual intelligence estimate. One can extrapolate or infer the various elements that went into such an estimate; one can, after more than a decade, judge the quality of this estimate in terms of predictive performance; and one can even put oneself in the shoes of the policy maker who was required to make important decisions on the basis of this kind of information.

The above strategic intelligence estimate was labeled as "Special" because it dealt with the specific subject of "bloc" support of the Viet Cong.

The next sample is simply a digest of a "National Intelligence Estimate," and it is distinguished by the general nature of the subject it treats—"Prospects in Vietnam." This is National Intelligence Estimate No. 53–63, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board, dated 17 April 1963 [1971, *United States-Vietnam Relations* Book 12, pp. 522–524].

Prospects in South Vietnam
The Problem
To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.
Conclusions
A. We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive

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indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt. (*Paras. 27–28*)

B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the situation which will lead to victory. They evidently hope that a combination of military pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable circumstances either for delivering a *coup de grace* or for a political settlement which will enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south in an effort to win a quick victory. (*Paras. 29–31*)

C. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the countryside. However, we do not believe that it is possible at this time to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragile. (*Para. 32*)

D. Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon which the insurgency has fed. However, the government's capacity to embark upon the broader measures required to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable. (*Paras. 33–35*)

Keep in mind that the above estimate is the product of a multi-billion dollar foreign intelligence system. Note also that it is presented as the *best information available* from the government's entire intelligence system, including spies, electronic devices, broken enemy secret codes, computers, social science analysis, and the best interpretative, analytical, and writing skills—supposedly—available to the government. When all of this is said, note also how the President and his principal advisers are left with the clear opportunity to make their own final estimate. For it will be observed that, in back-to-back sentences, for our side "the situation is improving" and U.S. involvement is causing the enemy "increased difficulty" and yet "the situation remains fragile" and "lasting political stability is questionable."

It must be understood that most strategic intelligence estimates are likely to be of this sort, leaving the decision maker in effect to make his own decision about what the situation actually is and how it can be affected by actions within the control of the decision maker.

Having sketched the categories and nature of intelligence, let us turn now to the question of how the intelligence product, in its various forms, is produced. What are the principal steps in the intelligence process? What is the process that leads up to such "products" as have just been illustrated?

The Intelligence Process

The intelligence process may be described in the most general terms as involving three basic steps: first, collection of information; second, its evaluation, analysis, interpretation, and synthesis; and third, its communication to consumers. This level of generalization, however, does not convey much of the true nature of the intelligence process or the real-life complexities involved. Strategic intelligence by definition is high-level, "national" intelligence that is the product of a vast system involving many disparate elements and institutional levels. At the lowest level, the intelligence process is relatively simple when, to use a military illustration, a patrol sets out to gather information and reports this directly to the company commander. The commander must of course evaluate the reliability and credibility of the patrol leader and members and judge the quality of the data supplied. But he can do this on a face-to-face basis. The President of the United States, on the other hand, receives at the highest level intelligence reports and estimates that, in most cases, have been filtered through dozens of layers, and originated from perhaps hundreds of sources. It is much more difficult for him to evaluate the product. The company commander is both the intelligence analyst and the decision maker, but at the Presidential level, the information has been subjected to a variety of layers among collectors, analysts, producers, writers, and in the case of verbal briefings "actors"—each of whom can shape the information either deliberately or unconsciously in a variety of ways.

The process may be better understood if a more detailed delineation of various steps is made. It is useful to consider these analytically separable steps in the strategic intelligence process: the setting of requirements; collection; processing of information; analysis; dissemination or communication; and finally—and most crucial as well as elusive—the use of the information.

Requirements

One principal reason that the United States intelligence system has grown enormously in the past 20 years is the difficulty of setting requirements. That is to say, much greater economy of effort might have been possible with a more precise definition of requirements. In the absence of such precision, the whole world comes under surveillance, and the "requirements" tend to become indiscriminate amassing of data. Without careful attention to requirements, the strategic intelligence system can come to resemble a huge vacuum cleaner, sweeping up indiscriminately everything

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in its path. Hoping to avoid this, bureaucrats have tried to see that collection labor be elaborately divided, specialized institutions developed, and intelligence missions assigned with particular care for bureaucratic jurisdictions.

Ultimately the setting of intelligence requirements may actually be decided on the basis of resources available. Since unlimited resources are almost never available, certain *essential elements of information* must be identified. These are the raw material basic to the setting of requirements. In intelligence doctrine, the distinction is sometimes made between basic requirements and essential elements of information. At a low level of operations, basic requirements would be information on weather and terrain for a military operation; at a high level requirements might be data on gross national product, balance of international payments, or the strength of a political coalition. Essential elements of information, in these illustrations, would be, at a low level, a determination of whether the enemy will attack and specifically information on Highway 5; at the highest level the essential elements might be how a particular element in a government would respond to a given diplomatic move.

Sometimes the political leader or the military commander may set specific requirements or even specify essential elements of information. More often than not, the strategic intelligence system works at anticipating intelligence needs, once requirements have been set primarily by statutory and administrative arrangements. It may not be too much to say that the setting of requirements and the definition of essential elements of information may be the most important long-term feature of an intelligence system. Supplying the decision maker with what he needs to know prior to a decision is the ultimate, ideal objective of an intelligence system, but, as earlier noted, rarely obtained.

A national intelligence system will be guided by a broad and secret statement of intelligence objectives and requirements, periodically revised. These provide the guidance for the next crucial step in the intelligence process, collection.

Collection

Perhaps the most important characteristic of this step is specialization. In the strategic intelligence system of a major power, a myriad of collection efforts are constantly in action, ranging from the monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts to the interception of the secret coded messages of a foreign government or the most daring attempt to steal data by espionage. Most commonly the collection process is categorized in terms of types of sources. An important point to note is that contrary to popular notions about the nature of an intelligence service, open sources—available to anyone—usually provide the greatest part of the information used by intelligence analysts. A collection plan for strategic intelligence, however, will be designed in the hopes of exploiting the widest possible range of intelligence sources, open as well as secret. As earlier indicated, sources are unlimited, but it is possible to stipulate the principal source categories. These are listed and described here in the general order of their importance—in terms of the amount of information supplied to the strategic intelligence process.

First of all are the commercial *news services*. It was once facetiously stated that were the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* to cease operations because of a labor dispute, hundreds of analysts in the national intelligence system would be without work. More seriously, it should be understood that all national intelligence services constantly monitor the press news "tickers" as well as domestic newspapers and periodicals. They are a major source of current information, and intelligence analysts sometimes find themselves in competition with journalists to get the "scoop" or news "beat" on current events. And, as intelligence professional Jack Zlotnick wrote in 1964, "many an analyst has to leave his warm bed in the early morning hours to prepare his quick assessment of a news scoop ticking over the press wires" [p. 17].

A second important source for the collection of raw intelligence data is *foreign specialty publications*, such as economic and other technical journals, which include, for example, publications on agriculture, engineering, manufacturing and the like. Such sources are of more use for generalized surveys and background research studies than for current intelligence, because of the normal publication time lag.

A third important resource is the monitoring of *radio broadcasts*. These may be of greater importance in time of war than in peace, and in each case there is often a heavy overlay of propaganda from government-controlled radio broadcasts. The importance and use of radio broadcasts varies with the degree of freedom such broadcasts enjoy from government or political party censorship and control. Use of radio broadcasts for strategic intelligence purposes requires sophisticated techniques of content analysis.

A fourth source of intelligence is data obtained from *non-government domestic institutions*, such as universities or commercial or other enterprises with overseas operations. Therefore foreign intelligence organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency maintain domestic offices in various cities within the United States. The CIA has no domestic intelligence functions

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as such, but some of the information needed may require a domestic collection plan.

The *diplomatic establishment* is a fifth major category of intelligence sources. The basic function of the diplomat is to supply information to his government. But the protocols of diplomacy, developed over the years, rule out espionage activity by diplomats. The intelligence function of diplomats, while a major part of their work, must remain within the boundaries of information set by the foreign governments to which they are accredited. In the years of cold war, rules of diplomacy have sometimes been violated by most foreign governments, when they use the diplomatic establishment as a cover for espionage or interventionist political intrigue.

A sixth institutionalized source of intelligence in the process is the *military attachés.* Their function is in some ways very similar to that of the diplomat. But the attaché confines himself to military intelligence. Like the diplomat, he generally collects only that information which the host foreign government wishes him to have. In fact, the attaché will receive formal invitations to attend various foreign military maneuvers or reviews. He will tour military installations as the guest of his foreign host. He is in fact accredited by the government of the foreign nation to which he is assigned. The reason governments have adopted the attaché system, even in the very competitive world of power politics, is the perceived mutual strategic intelligence advantage in the exchange of this kind of information. In recent years the American government has expanded the concept of attaché, so that there are now labor attachés, cultural attachés and the like. Civilian attachés, like the military, are expected to confine their activities to the collection of non-secret foreign information.

Still another, and seventh, category of information is *photography and other "sensing" methods* that, in the age of missiles and artificial satellites, have come to be one of the most important and expensive sources of intelligence data. Photographs constitute the kind of hard, concrete data rarely matched by other forms of intelligence. Hundreds of millions of dollars are now expended annually on such sources. These have expanded beyond photography to a wide range of electronic eavesdropping and sensing devices, use of infrared sensors, and a whole new world of surveillance apparatus provided by modern technology.

Finally, the most glamorized source of intelligence information—the category that supplies the stereotype in the public mind that tends to identify intelligence with spying—is *secret or covert collection methods.* It is important here to note the distinction between secret and covert. The secret—sometimes called clandes-

tine—method is that attempted collection of information occurring completely outside the view of the counter-intelligence agencies of the target system. Covert collection is that activity that goes on under the cover of some other function. For example, a foreign aid official will in fact be an intelligence agent, using the foreign aid organization as the cover for his true mission. As earlier indicated, even diplomatic offices are sometimes used as cover, although this violates the protocols of diplomacy. But in part because diplomats resist being used in this way, it is much more common for military organizations, foreign aid, propaganda or private business enterprises to be used for cover in the covert collection of information.

Evaluation of the quality and reliability of information gained through espionage is more of a serious problem than with information gained from other more open sources or "hard" information such as photographs. For judgments must be made not only as to content but as to the reliability of the information source.

After evaluation, the next step is the processing and analysis of the raw data. If one can imagine the massive scope of a national intelligence system and the mountains of data that pour into the system constantly, one will readily see that a wide variety of specialists will be assigned to various categories of data. Part of the processing problem therefore is similar to that of operating a large library or, in effect, a huge reference system that will be of use only if it represents carefully conceived procedures for analysis, storage, and retrieval. Strategic intelligence systems from earliest days have floundered on the problem of getting the evaluated and analyzed information to those who need to have it for decisions in a timely fashion. So a crucial step in the intelligence process is the classification, indexing, and storage of the data so that it will be on call by methods which users can utilize effectively.

An efficient reference system, utilizing in some cases the latest techniques of automation for retrieval, is therefore a prerequisite for analysis. Analysis is the important step in which raw data are utilized in the "production" of intelligence—or what is sometimes referred to as "finished intelligence." In a basic way, the analysis stage in intelligence production is similar to basic research in an academic environment. It differs primarily in that the decision-making consumer often has great impact on the product. This is so in several ways. For one thing, the consumer initially has played a role in setting intelligence requirements, either through asking a specific question or in specifying certain categories of information needed. Another way that intelligence analysis differs from pure academic research is that the consumer is less interested in

theories or generalizations than in short-run, practical questions of immediate policy relevance. He is less interested in discovering new knowledge than he is in knowing about the current situation. Finally, there are subtle ways in which the intelligence consumer influences the intelligence process in ways not usually felt in academic research. This is in the tendency for the analysis to be influenced by what the consumer wants to hear. This effect can be seen somewhat in the examples of estimates given above.

The next step in the process is intelligence production. This has been dealt with above by the description of the various categories in which intelligence reports may be produced, ranging from the spot reports of current intelligence to the lengthy, long-term encyclopedic intelligence surveys. Needless to say the form in which intelligence is produced can have a major influence on how it is disseminated and utilized in making and applying policies and strategies.

The next to last step is commonly called "dissemination." Essentially it is a communications process. A central feature to be understood here is that there are various circles of privilege within which intelligence is disseminated in its various "finished" categories. There is a small "inner circle," outer circles, and a number of intermediate circles, all conceived on the somewhat arbitrary basis of "need to know."

Security concerns pervade intelligence organizations. Security consciousness is considered a prime requisite for an intelligence professional. This fact has profound impact upon the dissemination of intelligence. It affects how the finished product is communicated, i.e. by courier, wire, or radio, in code or in the clear. These considerations of course can affect the speed of transmission. Not only the means of communication are affected by security. Equally as important, the question of who the recipients will be is determined by security considerations. An elaborate security classification policy has evolved to cope with this enormous problem. As indicated, the guiding principle has security as well as political and efficiency aspects. This is the conception of *need to know*. In general there is a prejudice that favors sharply limiting the circle of those involved in policy making who have a need to know. The overlay of politics and power here cannot be ignored, in the sense that sharing information is sometimes the equivalent of sharing power.

The dissemination problem is a fundamental one. It is never really solved. An intelligence report marked Top Secret cannot be read by a person whose top clearance is Secret, and so on. But it may be that the Top Secret report contains information of vital importance to the person not entitled, by security rules, to read it. The problem is compounded by the fact that a vigorous "need to know" policy often prevents even those with the proper "clearance" from seeing certain reports because a need to know cannot be demonstrated in the bureaucratic context or cannot be proved in advance of the dissemination of pivotal information.

Assuming that there are always some proper strategic secrets, the dissemination stage of the intelligence process sometimes confronts security officials with dilemma. This is illustrated by the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Joint Congressional Committee that investigated the attack after the war illustrated the dilemma in these words: "The fact that the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance [that is, to be kept secret] than the information obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan" [Zlotnick 1964, p. 26]. In retrospect it often is easy to identify such disastrously inverted priorities, and intelligence systems ought to be able to learn from history. They do not often seem to do so. Overemphasis on secrecy and security can jeopardize national security. The operational rule seems to be "When in doubt, classify or restrict circulation." History would seem to suggest a better rule: "When in doubt, disseminate."

The last step in the process is the use of intelligence. This is a subject in its own right that cannot be given adequate attention here. But to generalize and to oversimplify, the use of intelligence is characterized by two tendencies: On the one hand, the decision maker has a selective perception in the use of intelligence. His tendency is to see in intelligence reports what he wants to see. This problem is fundamentally aggravated by the tendency of intelligence agencies to supply decision makers with information they judge to be preferred by the decision maker. This is a complicated issue, and the record is usually not open to scholars to enable confirmation. Nor is the record always consistent. Pearl Harbor was a surprise to American leaders because they expected the Japanese attack to come elsewhere; Stalin was surprised by Hitler's attack on Russia because he did not wish it to happen; Hitler was surprised by the Normandy invasion in part by deception but in some measure because his mind had become fixed on the Calais area as the locus for invasion; in more recent times American leaders were surprised by the early development of Russian atomic weapons and missiles because their minds were fixed on the erroneous notion of American technological superiority in these fields. And so on. This tendency is so pronounced that Wilensky [1967] calls it an "information

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pathology." Some intelligence officials over the years come to believe that in the last analysis strategic intelligence is irrelevant in the face of these tendencies on the part of policy makers. The Vietnam War may be said to be the prime example of this problem in the 1960s and 1970s.

Another step in the process may be suggested, although it is not part of intelligence doctrine. This is periodic assessment of the intelligence product and performance or a "post-mortem" following an intelligence failure. Such a review would allow for the refinement of requirements and the possible improvement of each step in the process, assuming that the cause of failure has been identified.

To sum up the intelligence process, it may be useful to view it as circular, with no clearly identifiable starting point in reality.

Setting of
Requirements

Use

Collection

Dissemination

Production

The Organizational Environment

All major powers maintain sizeable intelligence systems. Newly developing nations see intelligence agencies as a status symbol. As modern world politics becomes more complex, intelligence agencies are increasingly important. They have greatly expanded in size and scope of operations, have become more professionalized, and in recent times play a more influential role in policy making than ever before.

But as earlier noted, secrecy shrouds strategic intelligence structures and functions from public view. Circumstances of the Cold War, however, and highly publicized intelligence failures or disclosed disasters in covert operations—such as the Bay of Pigs in 1961—and a number of subsequent disclosures have shed some light on the outlines of the major intelligence services. Another source of information is the occasional ideological "defection" from one side or another in the Cold War.

While strategic intelligence has a universal function,

one may discern three major types of intelligence structure: the United States system, which has influenced intelligence structures in those nations coming under American control at the end of World War II, such as Japan and West Germany; the British model, on which most Western European nations have patterned their systems; and the model of the Soviet Union, copied by most nations dominated by Communist parties.

United States

World War II saw American intelligence organized on a government-wide basis for the first time. During the war the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) came into being, in part to gather and coordinate strategic intelligence but also to conduct secret operations behind enemy lines. At war's end the OSS was demobilized. From some of its remnants, the new Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress in 1947 [Kirkpatrick 1968, Ransom 1958].

Functions of the CIA were specified by statute: to advise the National Security Council, including the President, on foreign intelligence activities; to coordinate, correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national intelligence within the government; and to perform intelligence and other intelligence-related functions of common governmental concern best performed centrally. Operating guidelines are specified in secret NSC intelligence directives that spell out CIA's functions and delineate the roles, missions and jurisdictions of other government intelligence agencies.

Since 1947 through an evolutionary process the CIA has come to have three major functions: foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence overseas, and clandestine political operations, including psychological warfare. The Director of Central Intelligence heads the CIA and is also the President's principal intelligence adviser. As chairman of the United States Intelligence Board he serves as a kind of chief appellate judge in the American intelligence community. The U.S. Intelligence Board comprises the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Department and its subsidiaries—the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency—plus representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approval by this Board is the final step in an elaborate process of producing a "National Intelligence Estimate." The principal "members" of the "intelligence community" include the following:

The *Department of State*, through its Bureau of Intelligence and Research, headed by an Assistant Sec-

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retary of State, collects (from open sources), analyzes, and disseminates political intelligence. This Bureau, organized along geographic and functional lines, produces a variety of policy-oriented reports.

The *Defense Intelligence Agency*, created in 1961, is a part of the Department of Defense and the newest major member of the intelligence community. The DIA's Director is the principal intelligence adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The *National Security Agency* is the largest and most secret of American intelligence agencies. It keeps the world under electronic surveillance, makes and breaks codes, and is responsible for the security of American secret communications. From its Fort George Meade headquarters in Maryland, NSA operates a vast system for electronic intelligence.

The *Atomic Energy Commission* collects, produces, and consumes strategic intelligence about foreign nuclear energy and weapons. An intelligence division forms atomic intelligence policies, sets AEC requirements, and coordinates atomic intelligence operations.

The *Federal Bureau of Investigation* has a limited role in strategic intelligence estimates. Essentially, the FBI is responsible for internal (domestic) security. It has no overseas functions, although the FBI's counterintelligence activities may sometimes turn up information of importance in strategic estimates.

Other agencies having some role include the *Treasury Department*, which follows foreign finance developments; the *Commerce Department*, gathering foreign information on factors affecting U.S. exports; the *Agriculture Department*, concerned with foreign produce; the *U.S. Postal Service*, sometimes assigned mail surveillance duties for intelligence purposes; and the *Secret Service*.

Great Britain

The British Secret Service was organized under the first Elizabeth. Rather than having a central intelligence agency, Great Britain maintains a confederation of agencies coordinated by a Cabinet subcommittee.

The two principal intelligence organizations are the Secret Intelligence Service (commonly called MI-6 because of its military origins) and the Security Service (popularly termed MI-5), which is a counterintelligence and internal security arm of government. Scotland Yard, Special Branch, is the overt arm of the Security Service; it makes arrests and presents evidence in security cases while "MI-5" agents remain in the shadows. A third important service is the Defense Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defense, consolidating in 1965 what formerly were separate armed service intelligence units.

These agencies, along with such specialized units as the Government Communications Center (for code making and breaking) and Foreign Office intelligence groups, are coordinated by a Joint Intelligence Committee. A high official of the Foreign Office presides over JIC, embodying the firm British principle of civilian policy control.

Soviet Union and China

The intelligence system of the U.S.S.R. resembles in many ways that of the United States, but differences are distinct and important. Major intelligence functions are coordinated by a central civilian organization, the *Komitet Gosudarstennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB). This "Committee on State Security" dominates the entire structure, enabling strict Communist Party controls. KGB's coordination extends to a large Defense Ministry intelligence arm, the *Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie* (GRU). This "Chief Intelligence Directorate" conducts primarily military intelligence operations overseas. At certain periods in the evolution of the Soviet intelligence system, GRU has seemed to be in competition with KGB. The total Soviet intelligence effort in supposedly the largest in the world.

Communist China is known also to maintain a massive intelligence apparatus. Because of its isolation, little is known about it. The best information suggests that the Chinese system is divided into four major intelligence units: that of the party, the foreign office, defense ministry, and of the State Council (government). Each not only performs intelligence functions but checks on the others. The Chinese Communist Party, through its Politburo and more specifically its "Social Affairs Department" (similar to Russia's KGB) attempts to exercise dominant overall controls.

Overview of Strategic Intelligence

Any intelligence system is ultimately tested by how well it describes reality in the external situation, gives timely warning of imminent dangers, and identifies policy opportunities. In other words, it is successful if it forewarns decision makers. Intelligence failures are more publicized than successes. Sometimes the failure may have been in the *use* rather than the quality of information. As Wohlstetter explains [1962] the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor may be regarded as such a failure. As noted, most intelligence systems incline towards telling national leaders what they want to hear, and decision makers often seem compelled to believe what they want to believe and to perceive "facts" according to preconceived notions. Both Hitler and

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Stalin suffered the consequences of wishful thinking in World War II. Wishful thinking may also have been the basis for major American failures, such as the Korean War and Chinese intervention, unexpectedly early success of the Soviets with atomic weapons, Soviet space achievements, and the strength of the insurgency in South Viet Nam [de Rivera 1968, Whiting 1970].

American successes have mostly been in the technological realm of intelligence, such as the U-2 aircraft flights that gave hard data on Soviet missile progress in the late 1950's and the outstanding American intelligence performance in forewarning of China's atomic and missile developments in the mid-1960's.

Rapid advances in communications and related technologies predicted for the future will bring new assignments, challenges, and capabilities to all intelligence systems, and new problems of policy, organization, and control of intelligence systems. Man's grasp for strategic intelligence, however, will always exceed his reach.

Strategic Intelligence as a Research Frontier

Study of strategic intelligence offers a challenging research frontier because information possibly is the most important variable in institutional and individual behavior. Signals, messages, and messengers constitute the vital blood of the body politic, but information may be the variable we know least about. Institutional descriptions and doctrinal analyses aside, how is information really gathered, analyzed, communicated, received and perceived? How is it used, or ignored? The way information determines behavior may be at once the most difficult and challenging research frontier of the social sciences [Hermann 1971, Jervis 1970, Pollack 1968].

A phenomenon of modern times is the spectacular rate of growth of information technology and bureaucracy. This expansion of techniques for collecting, evaluating, interpreting, and transmitting or storing of information is manifest in many segments of modern society, but particularly in the "mega-machines," to use Mumford's term [1970], of the national government's strategic intelligence bureaucracies. Information "mega-machines" are viewed as an empirical sign of the highest stage in economic development, but also are normatively viewed with concern about their implications for individual freedom and privacy and particularly with alarm for their potentially destructive impact upon the democratic idea. In simple generalization, a collective polity or an individual person becomes potentially subservient to institutions able to

manipulate the collection, evaluation, storage and flow of information. The ideal of government by informed consent tends to become rule by manipulated consent. For example, one may hypothesize that the allocation of more than a trillion dollars in American resources for a militarized containment foreign policy has since 1947 been supported, if not manipulated, by the intelligence system. This is to say that foreign and defense policies have been based upon an intelligence premise about the "enemy's" power and intentions.

Giant strategic intelligence bureaucracies created to inform decision makers about the "realities" of the external world are institutional manifestations of this larger problem. A strategic intelligence system has become a major and often pivotal part of the government's decision-making system. But this system functions in secrecy while it informs decision makers with secret information, secretly gathered, on what could be life or death decisions for the nation. Additionally, decision makers apply secret instruments towards attaining sometimes secret foreign policy objectives. Thus the nation is confronted with dual problems arising out of the existence of secret missions in an open society. It is highly likely that similar problems, in different institutional contexts, confront all great world powers.

The pages following will survey the United States government's strategic intelligence system with three questions in mind. First, how much do we know about this system; indeed, can we confidently use the term "system"? Second, how much more can be learned? And, third, what are some feasible research approaches to a subject matter for which most of the archives are closed indefinitely and where much of the data are protected as official government secrets?*

Even to suggest that such subjects are research frontiers is at once controversial and paradoxical. Controversial because leaders of the system past or present disagree about the necessity for and about the costs and benefits of, secrecy. Paradoxical because logic demands that a secret service remain secret.

American democratic government, however, has its own logic. Government by meaningful consent requires informed consent. So a vast secret intelligence bureaucracy is something of an anomaly in a democracy, particularly one that, unlike parliamentary government, "separates" the authority among executive, legislative and judicial branches. Even granting some special executive roles and privileges in foreign policy making, there is in theory no concept comparable to the British notion of "crown privilege" in foreign affairs

*This survey of the research frontiers was made in 1971–1972 with the aid of a grant from Russell Sage Foundation of New York.

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that is compatible with American democratic ideals. While the President is clearly dominant, the American Constitution assigns a substantial amount of foreign policy-making authority to the representative legislative body (Congress). And yet secret intelligence activities patently demand fewer popular controls than, say, public health, education, or welfare. The annual budgets for the intelligence services are closed to public or even general Congressional view; the product of the system is rarely seen directly; and many basic facts of policy, organization, and control are held by but a tiny few. Moreover, the people were told by Richard Helms, the nominal professional head of the intelligence system in 1971, that they must accept "on faith" that the system is led by honorable men who would perform only necessary and proper functions. American democracy, it can be argued, forbids public officials from making such a request.

One must understand the strategic intelligence system if one would understand the arrangement of power in the American political system. Perhaps the underlying general assumption—still untested—is that the power of the top foreign and defense policy decision makers today "is very largely the power of their information monopoly" [Westin 1971, p. 248]. Parenthetically it ought to be noted that an information "monopoly" would likely be the key to decision-making power in almost any system.

In a recent book, *The Intelligence Establishment* [1970], I have described the intelligence bureaucracies that have evolved in the United States since 1947. In this work are identified and analyzed some major problems of intelligence purpose, policy organization and control. Many questions remain unanswered or perhaps even unasked in my book. Certainly other social scientists would pose some questions differently [Blum 1972]. A great amount of scholarly work remains to be done from a variety of disciplinary approaches in this still relatively unexplored social science frontier. But the scholar who would pursue this subject further will confront substantial barriers or dead ends. These and other obstacles to research must not be underestimated, and yet the subject is too important and its ramifications too pervasive to accept total inhibition of further research.

A Research Overview

The general subject has attracted a vast array of popular writing because of the mystery and romance connected with the work of the spy, the counter-spy, and the secret agent. For a general distillation of political science literature see Ransom [1968, pp. 415–421] and for sociology see Wilensky [1968]. The lengthy

unpublished bibliography compiled by William R. Harris (1968 and earlier segments) at Harvard University identifies an extensive and wide-ranging body of literature relating to some aspect of intelligence activities, very broadly defined. Yet this array of millions of printed words leaves most of the questions listed below in this essay unanswered.

Several categories of writing can be identified and illustrated by the following examples, which I do not claim represent a thorough critique of the literature but merely a sample.

Doctrinal issues. What should be the role of the intelligence professional in policy making? Should he be an "expert" removed from involvement with or concern about particular values or policy preferences? Should he be isolated from day-to-day policy concerns and preoccupied simply with getting the facts on the assumption that if all the facts are in hand, the decision is automatic? Or should he work in close contact with the policy maker, sharing his values and concerns and supplying the informational input; indeed telling the policy maker what he needs to know prior to shaping a policy?

Pettee and Kent emphasized an analytic distinction between policy making and intelligence analysis. Pettee, however, saw a danger in too great a distance between decision makers and analysts so he advocated the decentralizing of intelligence functions, with each government department having its own intelligence staff [Pettee 1946]. Kent felt that knowledge of a foreign nation's capabilities or intentions cannot be adequately developed by those with responsibility for policy and policy application and saw intelligence as essentially a staff function to be performed in some organizational and intellectual isolation from policy making [1949, pp. 180–206].

Knorr has pointed to the absence of a satisfactory theory of intelligence, either descriptive or normative. Without a theory that either describes how intelligence work actually is performed or how it ought to perform, he has argued, there are few criteria for judging whether intelligence work is effectively performed and there are inadequate guides either to questions of process or of organization. Knorr calls for research on a theory of intelligence, which he says must be both conceptual and empirical and which would require access to intelligence records [1964, pp. 46–48].

Hilsman, in the early 1950's, made a survey in Washington, D.C., of the opinions of intelligence consumers and producers. He reported [1956, pp. 37–122] a prevalence of the notion of "report the facts only" as the dominant value among intelligence professionals, policy makers, and those responsible for implementing policy. Hilsman saw this notion as an unwise

disassociation of intelligence from policy. One important consequence was the production of a large number of intelligence reports with little relevance to real problems.

Organizational issues. Organizational issues are closely related to doctrinal issues. Allen Dulles argued that intelligence and policy should be sharply separated organizationally. He was a leading proponent of the intelligence school that carries the banner: "We give information only, not policy advice." This is, of course, the rationale for a central agency, independent from the policy and operating departments [1963, p. 51].

Related issues. Like Dulles' views in 1963, much of the literature on intelligence constitutes commentary based upon experience, intuitive observation, or general speculation. Access to intelligence records has been denied the scholar working outside the government service, even with regard to historical materials of the distant past. For example, it seems unlikely, without radically new policies, that a detailed, scholarly history of the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945, could be written at this time. Smith's 1972 volume, however, shows what can be done with interviews.

The aforementioned commentary has ranged over a wide ground, as the following summary of illustrative propositions will indicate:

- That more than 80% of intelligence raw material comes from open sources [Ransom 1970, p. 19], an idea supported by Sherman Kent [1956, pp. vii–ix].
- The contrary view that the truly important intelligence information can only be gained from espionage directed at highly secret sources [Orlov 1963, pp. 5–12].
- That intelligence is often used or misused, for gaining support for preferred policy positions [Ransom 1970, p. 103, 218].
- That American diplomatic styles must be altered to incorporate covert operations into its range of policy instruments [Cottam, 1967]. This view is contested by Paul Blackstock [1964, p. 313], who argues that clandestine operations "are capable of preempting a policy-making role."
- That Congressional as well as Presidential surveillance of foreign intelligence activities has been inadequate [Ransom 1970, pp. 159–179].

Much of the literature cited here, though serious and informed in some degree, is based more upon intuitive generalization and judgment than hard data.

Research Topics and Questions

In any discussion of research feasibility, attention for the most part must focus on the following topics

and on the questions of whether and how these topics and questions relating to them can be further studied.

These topics are:

1. The statutory and administrative authority for existing strategic intelligence organizations and the assignment of intelligence resources, rules, and functions. What are the origins of the present United States intelligence establishment?

2. The intelligence "community" and its current configuration. To what extent is the term "intelligence community" a hortatory statement of aspiration and to what extent a working reality?

3. The purpose, methods and forms of the National Intelligence Estimate and other estimates. Do intelligence estimates make a crucial difference in decision making? Or, is "intelligence" irrelevant?

4. The legislative, executive and judicial controls over the intelligence system. Is the intelligence establishment effectively guided by responsible political authority or is it a "state within a state"?

5. The interface of domestic counter-intelligence (FBI) and national or strategic intelligence and counter-intelligence. Does the external intelligence system overlap the domestic police function, and are military and civilian foreign intelligence agencies under carefully delineated jurisdictional controls?

6. The impact of technology on the intelligence functions. Is technology changing the nature of intelligence operations? Has human intelligence (agent intelligence) a future? Is an overdependence on machine (hardware) intelligence developing?

7. Systems for data collection, categorization, storage, and retrieval. What is the current state of the art and promise of the future?

8. Methods of intelligence analysis. Do intelligence systems use the best and most modern techniques of social science analysis? Is the intelligence community adequately in contact with academic frontiers of knowledge?

9. Recruiting, training, and professional development in the intelligence services. What is the record?

10. Criteria for efficiency and effectiveness. Can such criteria be developed? How can effectiveness be measured? How does anybody know whether the $5–6 billions spent each year is a waste or not? Concern about this question prompted the President to order an organizational overhaul of the intelligence system in November 1971.

These, of course, are not the only topics or pertinent questions, but they would seem to cover the main ground. Few questions, indeed, are more basic to the social scientist than the relationship of knowledge to action. Certainly this is a permanently challenging issue. But when the questions addressed pertain to the relationship of secret knowledge, sometimes se-

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cretly gathered, to action that itself is sometimes a government secret, the subject matter is particularly challenging.

Let us now review briefly the first four of these questions.

Statutory and Administrative Authority for Existing Intelligence Organizations. As earlier noted, the contemporary American intelligence system grew out of the National Security Act of 1947, with subsequent amendments and Presidential and Cabinet officer directives. The 1947 Act serves as a basic charter and was phrased in a deliberately flexible language. Yet the substance of this charter was the product of considerable conflict and compromise, and its constitutional history has never been fully explored.

Congress has played a minor role in the establishment and evolution of the U.S. intelligence system. The more important set of jurisdictional definitions and operational guidelines are found in some two dozen National Security Council intelligence directives, promulgated by the NSC at the impetus of the Director of Central Intelligence, who negotiated them with the various units of the intelligence system and with Presidential concurrence.

An example of the flexibility in the basic charter for the intelligence community is the fact that covert political operations are not recognized in that act as a function of the CIA: all of the assigned functions were to be *related to intelligence.*

Therefore the following proposition ought to be explored, tested, and explained: Most of the actual structure and assignment of roles and missions has been by executive fiat rather than by legislative authority. Did Congress intentionally abdicate its decision-making authority, or was there deliberate executive deception?

Strategic Intelligence "Community"—Current Configuration. The concept of intelligence community represents an ideal that may be simply stated: The various units in an information gathering and analysis structure work in harmony to produce a single intelligence estimate or prediction for the top decision maker that is an amalgam of the best knowledge on a question available to the government. The extent to which this is a working reality, or even the question of the degree of consensus on the ideal and its validity, are topics of importance and, indeed, research frontiers.

As a description of a structure, and a set of organizations and relationships, an intelligence community does exist. There are identifiable units; "boxes" on charts and inter-unit arrangements and procedures, capped specifically with the United States Intelligence Board, with proliferating committees. But a central question remains: Assuming that centripetal and centrifugal forces are at work, can these forces be iden-

tified toward a fuller understanding of how the system really works?

If various units of the "community" work at cross purposes, this will affect the intelligence product. Or if various units are in open conflict, knowledge of this, too, would enlighten us as to the reality of "community" within the system. Alleged animosity between the CIA and FBI, sometimes leading to failures in cooperation even though both are members of the community, is one of the legends of Washington. What are the realities?

Military intelligence, State Department intelligence, cryptography, and electronic intelligence, each has a special set of organizational characteristics, values, vested interests, and perhaps ways of looking at the world. The National Security Agency may be captivated with the hardware and science of intelligence gathering and want to meet intelligence requirements by taking much greater risks than would be acceptable to the Secretary of State. These are a few suggestions of the inevitable conflicts of interest that may function as centrifugal forces working against community.

Additionally, intelligence doctrine, which heavily emphasizes security, fosters a compartmented activity, with each compartment or unit normally maintaining a tight secrecy over its own activity. To what extent does such a compartmentation characteristic itself work at cross purposes with the concept of community? Are such questions researchable in a system so closely guarded by secrecy? The answer is that they must be pursued largely by means of interviews of alumni of the system. Case studies of particular events or categories of questions can be instructive and may be feasible. A limited amount of cooperation may be expected in some cases by current officials who may see some value in greater enlightenment about how the system works.

Estimates and Decision Making. Simplistic models of decision making show the intelligence input as a crucial, often pivotal, factor. Doubtless the intelligence estimate on occasion does determine the decision. But what is the reality? I would guess that a "bureaucratic politics" model is closer to reality than a "rational" or "organizational hierarchy" model. Is it possible in this regard to generalize with useful accuracy?

Contrary to some assumptions, no secret government answer to these important questions exists. But, after all, does the intelligence estimate make a difference or is it true, as some frustrated former intelligence officials have argued privately, that "In the last analysis intelligence is irrelevant in decision making"? The experienced policy maker will caution against generalization on such an issue and will likely point out that in most major decisions the intelligence estimate was

merely one of a number of factors. The implication is that in the normal situation, the intelligence input is not necessarily compelling. When faced with a single case for decision, the decision maker may normally find that the intelligence estimate does not point clearly to the preferred decision. His judgment, and not the estimate, determines the decision [Cooper 1972, Jervis 1970]. Out of these considerations arise two competing (and discouraging) premises:

1. Intelligence agencies tend to report what they think their leaders want to hear or see.
2. Leaders see or hear what they want, no matter what intelligence is reported.

The extent of these kinds of "information pathology," as Harold Wilensky has termed these tendencies (he illustrates them with cases), remains a challenging research frontier [1967].

Hypotheses can be developed to predict when intelligence estimates will or will not be accepted at their face value. Even so, testing them will remain an extremely difficult proposition, given government secrecy. Perhaps if those high in government discern value in such studies certain records will eventually be opened to scholars. It is not likely that this will be done without some compromises regarding free and full disclosure of findings.

Efficacy of Policy Controls. Major concern has been expressed outside the system over the years that the intelligence system has not been under adequate policy controls. Some have argued that both in the pursuit of secret information from foreign areas (espionage) and in covert political action, the CIA or related agencies have been too much "laws unto themselves." [Campbell 1971, Hilsman 1967]. Those defending the adequacy of policy controls insist that such controls are thorough and adequate. It is commonly asserted by insiders—or former insiders—that policy controls over secret political operations overseas are much tighter than for such programs as foreign aid, propaganda, or military operations. Existing public knowledge about these controls relates to three major policy control mechanisms: (1) the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB), (2) the special high-level interdepartmental "40 Committee" and (3) Congressional subcommittees for surveillance on intelligence operations.

Beyond the description of these mechanisms—the membership of the committees and the broadest description of their functions—little has been published. Further research in greater depth seems feasible with regard to each of these mechanisms.

However, in the absence of hearings, reports, records or other archival sources, which are all clas-sified and closed, the researcher must rely on interviews with past and present participants in these control mechanisms, both executive and legislative. It is clear from the preliminary survey that such interviews are generally possible and can be rewarding in gaining additional details on the functioning of these mechanisms. Meanwhile, one might consider the following exploratory hypotheses:

1. The closer the personal relationship between the Chairman of FIAB and the President, the greater will be the capacity of FIAB to monitor or to effect change in the intelligence system.

2. Units of the intelligence community can be expected to try to manipulate the perspectives of the FIAB.

3. The FIAB will tend to stress *post facto* problems of the intelligence system, that is, to investigate "failures" or "flaps" at the expense of "preventive maintenance."

4. Units within the intelligence system will tend to use the FIAB to effect changes in their status vis-à-vis other units in the system.

5. The President's attention to the work of FIAB will vary with the public visibility of the CIA and the other units of the political system.

6. Members of the Senate "inner club" and the House leadership group will regard secret intelligence access as a badge of seniority and power and will be negatively inclined to share this with the rank and file or even with the routine standing committees.

7. Congress as a whole possesses little knowledge of the basic facts of policy, organization, and control of the intelligence system.

8. The rank and file esteem in Congress for the CIA is low; the greater the knowledge of the organization, the higher the esteem.

9. An ambivalence exists among members of Congress generally regarding the question of whether they should be privy to secret facts about the secret intelligence organizations of the U.S. government.

10. Security (secrecy of defense and intelligence information) is a label easily manipulable to favor the special interests of the intelligence system.

Other Research Topics

On the other topics relating to the interface of domestic counter-intelligence and foreign intelligence, the impact of technology on intelligence functions, modern systems for information collection, storage and retrieval, methods of intelligence analysis, and recruiting, training and professional development, there is less to be said. Each of these topics is significant and

important to an understanding of the intelligence system, and each presents its own peculiar research challenge, but in no case would this seem to be completely insurmountable. A few of these topics would be impossible to research adequately without some government cooperation.

Technological advance and intelligence methods must be classed within government as one of the most sensitive areas of the system. And yet we are dealing with a "state of the art" question, and an open society offers abundant published information on technological developments that, by the skillful use of inference and speculation, can be rewarding in understanding the probable state of the art within the intelligence system. An illustration of what can be done is Robert D. Crangle, "The New Methodology of National Intelligence," an essay dealing in considerable detail with the technological state of the art of intelligence gathering [1969].

Another example of imaginative and rewarding work on the research frontier is the project undertaken by Paul W. Blackstock, of the Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina. Professor Blackstock circulated a "Confidential Intelligence Questionnaire" among a group of intelligence aides experienced in key posts "at the working level" within the intelligence system. In his questionnaire, Blackstock set forth a number of published observations by scholars relating to a broad range of topics related to the intelligence system, requesting detailed comments on such observations from his respondents. Blackstock's project is illustrative of a kind of research that proved feasible, although Blackstock did not receive the quantity of response that he had hoped for [1971].

Finally, the most important and difficult question of all relates to criteria for judging the efficiency of the intelligence system. As earlier suggested and as Klaus Knorr has so astutely observed, as long as theories of intelligence (theories as distinct from doctrine) are lacking, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the system. In the absence of theories, argues Knorr, "we have no criteria (indicators!) for judging whether intelligence work in the United States is done well or badly or for specifying ways of improving it" [1964, p. 47].

To call for theories of intelligence may be setting aspiration levels too high. The road to theory is long and tortuous. Perhaps some first steps down this road must be taken in the form of tentative hypotheses and cautious steps of generalization. One will be told by many "old hands" experienced in high-level policy making as well as in producing and consuming intelligence reports that "you cannot generalize." In the same

breath you will also likely hear the advice that because the filing cabinets are marked Top Secret, and because the scholar's "need to know" will be impossible to prove, it is foolish to consider the intelligence system a research frontier.

True frontiersmen will not be easily discouraged by all of the impediments to meaningful research, formidable as they are. The importance of the challenge must be met by an equally high fortitude and stubbornness. Otherwise we may never learn how we are governed and how information bureaucracies will likely govern us increasingly in the future. At stake may be nothing less than the adequacy of social science knowledge as well as the survival of democratic government. The importance of this general subject is dependant upon two assumptions: first, that success in government will rest upon the efficient production and management of knowledge; and second, that the most dangerous enemy of the United States is a misinformed group of decision makers.

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